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1. Japanese opinions about he Russian economy 
   When Japanese people think about he Russian economy, we may be somewhat rrogant. 
We often say that the Russian economy is an immature market economy, and therefore, it 
involves many crimes, unjustified economic diversity, and distrust between economic 
partners. 
   However, a series of economic s andals, which were recently revealed inJapan, showed 
that he market economy is immature, not only in Russia, but also in Japan. 
   In this paper, I will first give an outline of these conomic s andals inJapan, and next, 
point out the problems that have come to the forefront of Japanese society due to these 
scandals, and lastly, indicate the possibilities and challenges of Japan-Russia economic 
exchange, r ferring to these problems. 
2. The "Livedoor" scandal 
   One of the most shocking scandals inrecent Japan is the "Livedoor" scandal. 
   "Livedoor" isa Japanese company that had been owned and led mainly by Mr. Takahumi 
Horie, aged 33. The company was established asa small website diting business, named 
"On the Edge" in 1996 with 6 million yen (55,000 dollars). At that time Mr. Horie was still a 
student. In 2000, "On the Edge" was listed on "Mothers" ofthe Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
"M
others" is not a main market of TSE, but its new market for high-growth and emerging 
stocks. "Mothers" was established in 1999 in order that young and small companies could 
obtain capital. The name of "Mothers" probably means that a lot of young companies should 
be born and grown up in this market. Preparing for "Livedoor' s" listing on "Mothers," Mr.
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Table 1 History of "Livedoor" and Mr. Horie
1972 10 Mr. Horie was born.
1991 4 Mr. Horie entered Tokyo University.
1996 4 Mr. Horie started a small company "On the Edge" (editing websites).
1997 3 Mr. Horie left the Tokyo university before graduation.
2000 4
"O
n the Edge" was listed on "Mothers" of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
2002 2 Began to sell computer applications.
2002 11 Acquired "Livedoor," which is an Internet service provider.
2004 2 "On the Edge" changed its name to " Livedoor."
2004 3 Acquired a securities company.
2004 6 Released its hope to acquire a professional baseball team (loss-making).
2005 2
Acquired 35% of stocks of the "Nippon Broadcasting System," a parent company of
"F
uji TV."
2005 9 Mr. Horie ran for general election supported by the ruling party.
2006 1
The top managers of "Livedoor," including Mr. Horie, were arrested (violation of
Securities and Exchange Law).
Source: http://corp.livedoor.com/company/. Nikkei Business, 12 Dec. 2005, pp. 66-67. 
Horie employed an expert of finance, who taught him to get money by financial operation 
and changed the directrion of "Livedoor' s" business activity from website editing to financial 
operation and M&A. In 2002, "On the Edge" acquired "Livedoor Corporation," which was an 
Internet service provider. In 2004, "On the Edge" changed its name to "Livedoor," and 
acquired a securities company to develop its financial business. In the same year, "Livedoor" 
became well known by publicizing its hope to acquire a professional baseball team, popular, 
but loss-making. Japanese people were surprised to hear that the young man, Mr. Horie, and 
the young company, "Livedoor," had money enough to buy and operate a baseball team, 
although the buy-out did not succeed in the end. 
   In 2005, "Livedoor " suddenly released the information that the company had acquired 
35% stocks of the "Nippon Broadcasting System," which is the parent company of one of the 
most influential media companies in Japan, "Fuji TV." The president of "Fuji TV," got 
furious at the attempt of hostile takeover, rarely seen in Japan, but he could not help 
negotiating with Mr. Horie and agreed with "Livedoor" in a few months (Table 1). 
   The number of employees of "Livedoor" is not very large: 657 for "Livedoor" company 
itself, and 1, 647 for the "Livedoor" group in 2005. However, annual sales reached 78 billion 
yen (713 million dollars), more than 80% of which was earned by financial activity. "Livedoor'
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           Table 2 "Livedoor" group at its peak
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Number of Employees 1647
Annual sales (million dollars) 713
Market capital (million dollars) 9270
                Source: http://corp.livedoor.com/company/. 
               Livedoor' s financial report. http://www.sankei.co.jp/news/060117/keiO53.htm . 
s" financial activity seemed to be ingenious, using new techniques enabled by the economic 
deregulation since the end of 1990's. The market value of the "Livedoor" group reached 1,020 
billion yen (9,270 million dollars) (Table 2). When we remember that "Livedoor" was 
established just ten years ago, the rapid growth seems to be just amazing. 
   Mr. Horie was a star for young Japanese people and for opponents of the traditional 
ways of Japanese business. Partly for this reason, Mr. Horie ran for the last year' s general 
election supported by the ruling party, although he was barely defeated. Referring to my 
personal experience, last year, one of my students wrote an essay entitled "How Livedoor is 
managed." Another student submitted to me a report on "How to make money on the stock 
market," and said to me, "I believe it is more profitable to trade stocks than to work as an 
ordinary company employee." Undoubtedly he was influenced by the success of young 
businessmen like Mr. Horie, and young independent stock traders, who sell and buy stocks 
speculatively. 
   However, in January 2006, the top managers of "Livedoor," including Mr. Horie, were 
arrested, and in February, the company and the top managers were indicted on suspicion of 
violation of the Securities and Exchange Law (more accurately speaking, fraudulent 
transactions, diffusion of false rumors, and window dressing of financial statements). Now, 
the "Livedoor" group is on the brink of collapse (Touyou Keizai, 4 Feb. 2006; Asahi Shimbun, 
23 Feb. 2006), and hundreds of thousands of shareholders of "Livedoor" lost their money. 
   Although the investigation of this scandal is still continuing, it seems that "Livedoor" and 
its top managers are responsible for at least some illegal activities. 
3. "Livedoor" and Mr. Horie 
   "Livedoor" and Mr . Horie are very different from traditional types of Japanese 
enterprises and managers. 
   Let us compare "Livedoor" with a traditional Japanese company (Table 3).
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Table 3 "Livedoor" and a traditional Japanese company
"Livedoor"
a traditional company
business development
strategy
oriented to M & A of other
companies to grow up
centered on its own core business
financial strategy
for obtaining more and more
money by financial operations
for maintaining and developing its
own core business
alliance or cooperation
strategy
possibly short term and possibly
compelling a partner to cooperate
long-term, friendly relationships
recruiting anyone who has skill or experience
young people who have just
finished school or university
training
voluntarily by the worker him/
herself
provided by the company
length of employment short long
determinant of wage
differences
performance seniority
Reference: Horie, 2005. Livedoor, 2005. Nikkei Business, 12 Dec. 2005, pp. 66-67. 
   While a traditional company focuses on its own core business, "Livedoor" is oriented to 
M & A of other companies to grow up. While a traditional company uses its financial 
resources mainly to maintain and develop its own core business, "Livedoor" aims to obtain 
more and more money by financial operations. While a traditional company prefers long-
term, friendly relationships with business partners, "Livedoor" does not hesitate to organize 
relationships without a long perspective, sometimes compelling a partner into an alliance by 
way, for example, of a hostile takeover. While a traditional company recruits as its 
employees young people who have just finished school or university, "Livedoor" recruits 
anyone who has skill or experience. While a traditional company provides the necessary 
training for employees, "Livedoor" provides employees with just one personal computer and 
tells them to learn by themselves. While a traditional company places priority on long-term 
employment as a principle, in "Livedoor," the average period of employment is just over one 
year. While a traditional company adopts wage differences by seniority, "Livedoor," by 
business performance. 
       Of course "Livedoor's" strategies have its rationality under the condition of a market 
economy without mentioning illegal activities. And in fact, Japanese companies have been 
changing towards the direction of "Livedoor" type in recent years, but still now, "Livedoor" is 
very unique in the Japanese business circle. 
   Let us compare Mr. Horie with a typical Japanese corporate manager (Table 4).
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  Table 4 Mr. Horie and a typical Japanese corporate manager
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Mr. Horie a typical manager
age quite young middle-aged or older
fortune large not very big
residence
°Roppongi Hills
a detached house in the suburbs
values freedom, growth, money regulation, stability, human relationships
dress T-shirts and jeans dark suits with a tie
Reference: Livedoor, 2005; Horie, 2005. 
   While a typical Japanese manager is over middle age, Mr. Horie is quite young. While a 
typical Japanese manager does not have a very big fortune, Mr. Horie was said to have a 
fortune worth of 70 billion yen (636 million dollars) (Asahi Shimbun, 26 February 2006). While 
a typical manager lives in a detached house of quite modest proportions in the suburbs, Mr. 
Horie lives in "Roppongi Hills." "Roppongi Hills" is a complex of buildings located in the 
center of Tokyo city. "Roppongi Hills" comprises offices, residences, restaurants and 
entertainment facilities. The construction was recently completed in 2003, and the rental 
fees are very expensive. To live in "Roppongi Hills" often means that he/she is a young 
millionaire, engaged in especially IT industry or finance. While a typical manager considers 
economic regulation essential, Mr. Horie insists on the importance of economic freedom. 
While a typical manager prefers stability and emphasizes human relationships, Mr. Horie 
actively seeks growth and money. He wrote in one of his books (Horie, 2005), "We can obtain 
even other people' s heart or kindness to us just by money." While a typical manager always 
wears a dark suit with a tie, Mr. Horie wears everyday clothes such as T-shirts and jeans 
even for press conferences. 
   The characteristics of Japanese corporate managers seem to be quite stable, compared 
to those of Japanese companies, and the managers like Mr. Horie are exceptional. 
   Before the exposure of the scandal, we used to talk each other, whether we were for or 
against Mr. Horie. 
   In this way, "Livedoor" and Mr. Horie were symbols of the Japanese new way of 
business after the bubble economy, whether we liked them or not. After the scandal, 
however, Japanese people are more suspicious to this type of business and businessmen. 
4. Market economy and illegal activities 
   In Japan, there have many comments on the "Livedoor" scandal, most of which refer to
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the causal relationship of the scandal with the deregulation policy of the present Koizumi 
Administration since 2001. 
   That is, politicians near the Koizumi administration believe that there have been too 
many bureaucratic restrictions to Japan' s economy and they have seriously damaged the 
market mechanism, and restrained economic development. From this point of view, the 
Koizumi Administration has been promoting a policy of economic deregulation. 
   There are two radical opinions on the causal relationship between the scandal and the 
deregulation policy. (1) "Livedoor" scandal is an awful consequence of the deregulation policy, 
and a proof of the failure of the policy. The deregulation policy has made illegal activities 
easier. (2) The scandal is just a criminal activity by several people and their company, and 
not related to the deregulation policy. 
   In fact, "Livedoor" and Mr. Horie committed criminal activities, making use of the 
financial deregulation since the end of 1990' s, namely the adoption of the "Law on the 
Transformation of the Financial System," and the several amendments of the "Commercial 
Law" (Shimbun Akahata, 29 Jan. 2006). In addition, the Financial Service Agency hesitated 
to restrain the law-evading activities of "Livedoor," for fear of being criticized as an excessive 
regulation. Such an attitude of the Financial Service Agency possibly encouraged the 
company to proceed towards illegal activities (Uemura, 2006). 
   In my opinion, this does not necessarily mean the failure of the deregulation policy. The 
policy itself has enabled various kinds of new business, encouraged many people to start up 
business, and made people's lives more convenient. Any system transformation cannot avoid 
loopholes in the legal system; these loopholes must now be closed. 
5. Market economy and economic disparity 
   Such a controversy reignited another discussion concerning economic disparity in Japan, 
which has been widened during the Koizumi Administration. As a result of the economic 
deregulation, some companies and people became "winners," and others became "losers," and 
some of the "winners" proved to be illegal, like "Livedoor." 
   There are two radical opinions here, as well. (1) Economic deregulation has enlarged 
economic disparity to an unjustified level, spread mammonism, and made "losers" desperate, 
therefore leading us to a social crisis. (2) Economic disparity always accompanies a market 
economy and should not be rejected.
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    Generally speaking, any transformation creates "winners" and "losers," and in many 
cases, widens the economic gap. Moreover, a market mechanism itself essentially 
presupposes economic disparity. So, we cannot avoid disparity, but we must restrict the 
gap to an appropriate size, and provide the "losers" with a chance to revive. 
   As you see, this situation of recent Japan is similar to that of Russia since the transition 
to a market economy. 
   Although Japanese people may be more accustomed to a market mechanism than 
Russian people, and the economic deregulation by the Koizumi Administration is not as 
profound as the Russian transition, there are conflicts and confusion in Japan as well. 
   In these recent months, we have seen several corporate scandals in addition to the 
 "Li vedoor" scandal: A fast-growing construction company was proved to be selling 
earthquake-fragile buildings; another fast-growing company owing about 50 hotels in Japan 
was found to be rebuilding hotel buildings against the law or official restrictions, and 
removing appliances or equipment for people with disabilities. People in Japan take these 
scandals very seriously. Some of the "winners" of the economic deregulation have been 
revealed to be profiting at the cost of social responsibility. 
   Although market discipline is essential for the contemporary world, social discipline is 
also essential for the existence of the market economy itself, a point that we must not forget. 
6. Market economy and "trust" 
   Scholars of the neo-institutionalist school of economics have emphasized that "trust is an 
important prerequisite to well-functioning markets." Sometimes we might feel that trust is 
something emotional and not very important in a market economy controlled by the market 
mechanism, in other words, the price mechanism. However, most dealings in a market 
economy cannot be completed by a coincident exchange of a product for cash, and should 
continue in a long time, based on a contract. If the party of a contract does not fulfill the 
contract with honesty, the other party may suffer serious damage. A contract would be 
always incomplete, however far it went into details. When the party of a contract violates it, 
it is not easy for the other party to obtain compensation. In that meaning, a market economy 
is accompanied by "a transaction cost." When there is trust between parties, transaction 
costs are low and cooperation is easy. On the other hand, without trust, transaction costs 
are high, and cooperation is too risky, even if it looks profitable for both parties (Raiser et al.,
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2004, p. 55). 
   From this point of view, scholars of the neo-institutionalist school of economics have 
recognized the advantages of traditional Japanese management. According to their opinion, 
"k
eiretsu" transactions (transactions between parties in a corporate group) and lifetime 
employment are devices for reducing transaction costs. 
   Recently in Japan, most mechanisms of Japanese management have been doubted, and 
modified. For example, a "keiretsu" transaction is not as stable as before: original contractors 
examine the effectiveness of their subcontractors and if they are not sure of their 
effectiveness, they will cancel the contract, whereas subcontractors choose contractors other 
than the current ones, if it is more profitable to them. Moreover, a number of corporate 
managers think that lifetime employment is old-fashioned, and fire middle-aged employees 
who are thought to be expensive and useless, which brings about serious unemployment 
problems. On the other hand, some people do not hesitate to change their jobs for better 
treatment. Of course, this phenomenon has some positive elements, but at the same time, 
"trust" is at risk. 
   In addition, some people and companies that seemed to be prosperous as "winners" of 
the deregulation, were proved to be evading the law or committing illegal acts, as shown 
above with the example of the "Livedoor" scandal. 
   The Koizumi Administration are now starting to compensate for the negative results of 
the deregulation policy by providing renewed chances to the "losers" of market competition, 
and amending laws in order to close loopholes in the law system. 
   We feel the same suspense of business in Russia as of Japanese companies like "Livedoor". 
The "transaction costs" related to business with Russian companies seem to be quite high, 
because of the unstableness of the legal system, companies, employees, and so on, although 
this is inevitable to some degree under the condition of economic transition. 
   Probably Japanese companies are too cautious of their own business. But it is a sort of 
reality. 
7. Possibilities and challenges of Japan-Russia economic exchange making use of the special 
economic zones in Russia 
   We know that the Russian government authorized six special economic zones (SEZ) in 
Russia last year to introduce foreign direct investment, in which Japanese companies have a
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great interest. For Japan' s economy, Russia has traditionally been an energy resource base 
and an automobile market. However, we know that Russia has great potential in science and 
technology, as well as high-quality human resources. If Japanese companies can utilize them, 
it will be highly beneficial for both countries. 
   As you know, in February 2006, a video conference between Nizhnii-Novgorod and 
Tokyo was organized by the Japan center in Nizhnii-Novgorod. In the conference, Russian 
experts first introduced the six special economic zones, and representatives of several 
Japanese companies then questioned them and provided comments. 
   One of the findings of the conference is that Japanese companies want more concrete 
information about SEZ and, moreover, a relationship of mutual trust. One of the Japanese 
participants of the conference said, "The privileges given to the residents of SEZ are too 
abstract. For example, we are not sure whether the whole infrastructure of the zone will be 
constructed by the Russian side or not. And once you show us more concrete conditions of 
SEZ, please keep your promise. If you break your promise, we will be much annoyed." 
   Japanese companies have traditionally emphasized long, trustworthy relationships 
between business partners rather than short-term profit, which is a good tradition of 
Japanese management. Suffering from the business scandals that occurred in the last few 
months, including the "Livedoor" scandal, the Japanese are rediscovering the importance of 
tradition. 
   Japan-Russia economic exchange making use of special economic zones needs to be 
effective from the viewpoint of the market mechanism. However, it is more important for 
the success of SEZ that our economic exchange should be based on trust.
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